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Abstract 
This paper examines how the critical mass challenge manifests itself during inter-organizational platform 
development. In previous research, critical mass is treated as an issue that occurs after platform launch. 
Strategies proposed, such as tactful pricing, opening the platform, user onboarding, and side-switching 
assume the platform to have already been launched. They may not work well in conditions where the 
platform is still under development. Over a two-and-a-half-year time period, this study traced the 
development of a data platform in a revelatory case within the New Zealand tourism sector. It revealed five 
critical mass issues faced by the platform sponsor in phases of development that occur before platform 
launch: (i) attracting initial interest, (ii) aligning heterogenous goals, (iii) sustaining commitment to the 
project (iv), negotiating architecture design, and (v) sustaining commitment to implementation. These 
findings provide a foundation for problematizing critical mass theory and its boundary conditions in inter-
organizational platform development. 
Keywords 
Inter-organizational platforms, Inter-organizational systems, Platform ecosystems, Critical mass 
Introduction 
Platforms have become iconic organizational forms of the 21st century that drive innovation by configuring 
socio-technical systems that link resources, services, business actors, and users in various organizational 
areas (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). Data platforms offer services such as data analytics & 
visualization, and field-level forecasts between multiple firms (de Reuver, Nederstigt & Janssen, 2018; 
Jarvenpaa & Markus, 2018). They enable economies of scale because as many organizations participate, the 
scale of data resources and services also increases thereby increasing the value of such resources for each 
participating firm (de Reuver et al., 2018). This is an attractive option to small firms that may not afford 
owning or operating data services, and to larger firms that may not be able to access complete industry-
level data. It also creates valuable opportunities to external stakeholders such as government agencies, 
suppliers, and tech innovators who may want to know industry-level trends or to provide technological 
innovations on existing data systems. 
When a whole organizational field intends to launch a data platform, it faces a critical mass challenge about 
how to form consensus on many issues such as goals, strategy, design, and implementation. This is because 
inter-organizational relations often present conflicting interests and goals (Schirrmacher, Ondrus & Kude, 
2017; de Reuver et al., 2018). In order to launch such a platform, a sufficient number of firms need to join 
together and form a network with enough resources and capacity to effectively share data services and the 
costs associated with their development and maintenance. The benefits discussed earlier can only be 
achieved if a sufficient number of firms joins such a network and contributes to it.  
Critical Mass in Inter-Organizational Platforms 
 
Americas Conference on Information Systems          2 
 
A platform sponsor working with multiple firms and leading the development of an inter-organizational 
platform needs to coordinate a mass of users from multiple target firms. Available literature on strategies 
for launching platforms appear to concentrate on the event of the platform launch itself rather than the full 
length of processes that occur before launching. Thus, the launch is often treated as an event rather than a 
process (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010, pp.3-4) with minimal investigations into how a platform sponsor 
achieves a critical mass between multiple firms before a launch is possible, when the platform is still an 
aspirational goal. This could be because current research about platform launch tends to focus on one-to-
many type of platforms rather than those that are many-to-many and inter-organizational in nature (c.f. 
Tiwana, 2015). In addition, strategies proposed to create a critical mass are often built either on conceptual 
work or on ex-post studies of successful platforms. For instance, authors looked at opening the platform to 
users and providing extensive boundary resources to contributors (Ondrus, Gannamaneni & Lyytinen, 
2015), using pricing strategies and first party content subsidies (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013), as well as user 
onboarding and side switching strategies (Schirrmacher, Ondrus & Kude, 2017; Stummer, Kundisch & 
Decker, 2018). Empirical studies that longitudinally investigate the ways in which a platform sponsor enacts 
practices to generate a critical mass of users in an organizational field, and how such practices inform design 
decisions as a platform is being developed are still largely sparse.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze how challenges to generate critical mass emerge during inter-
organizational platform development. We look at the platform sponsor’s practices for coordinating multiple 
participating firms, and the issues that arise and must be dealt with at each developmental phase. We 
explore conjectures about when critical mass issues arise and how the platform sponsor responds to them 
using data from observations of the real-time development of an inter-organizational platform. Thus, we 
problematize the boundary conditions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) of the critical mass theory in the context 
of inter-organizational platforms. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: (i) a theoretical background, 
(ii) a description of the research methods, (iii) presentation of findings, (iv) a discussion of the implications 
of the findings, and (vi) a conclusion. 
Theoretical Background 
Platform Ecosystems 
Platforms ecosystems are organizational forms that link resources, services, business actors, and users 
(Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). Platform managers deal with two main layers of the platform: 
architecture and governance (Tiwana et al., 2010). Key technology features that form the base of platform 
architectures are: extensibility of the core, modularity and decomposability of components, inter-
dependence of functions, and flexible standards (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009). Thus, the technological 
architectures of a platform are seen as extensible software that allow developers to innovate by adding new 
modules for consumers, and creating environments for online collaboration, content co-production hubs, 
data hubs, social networking sites, and crowdsourcing (Tiwana et al., 2010). The governance level considers 
business models, decision rights, and rules of interaction created to manage the platform ecosystem.  
As intermediaries, platforms are sustained by the number of users who innovate, transact, and interact in 
value adding activities. These users include all contributors such as developers, creators, innovators, and 
consumers. Platforms become more valuable as more users join due to network effects (Parker, Van Alstyne 
& Choudary, 2016). With direct network effects, the platform becomes more valuable if users in the same 
user group join, whilst indirect network effects imply that the value of the platform depends on the users in 
other groups. Thus, platforms often emerge from and are affected by dynamics in markets dominated by 
network externalities (Anderson, Parker & Tan, 2014). 
For this study, we distinguish between two types of platforms. Type I platforms are created and then offered 
to developers and consumers for use. Most consumer-facing platforms such as operating systems, web 
browsers, app stores, online marketplaces, and e-commerce fit in this category. In Type I, platform 
development is done with minimal involvement of external parties. The platform is only offered to 
contributors and consumers after its development, which means that the platform sponsor wields control 
in its design and faces minimal challenges in addressing design and development issues from external 
parties before launch. Type II platforms sit between multiple institutions and act as inter-organizational 
systems (IOS) through which multiple firms interact and share resources and services (see Table 1). In some 
ways, the development process for such platforms is more challenging. They often need to be developed 
Critical Mass in Inter-Organizational Platforms 
 
Americas Conference on Information Systems          3 
 
through consensus, shared design choices, negotiated standards, and consortium governance models that 
require balancing of multiple goals (e.g. Markus & Bui, 2012; de Reuver et al., 2018). Our study focuses a 
specific type of an inter-organizational platform for sharing data resources and data services between 
firms. 
Table 1: Platform Ecosystems & Inter-Organizational Platforms 
Type I: Platform Ecosystems Type II: Inter-Organizational Platforms 
Platform sponsor’s organizational environment is 
different form the platform’s ecosystem environment 
Platform sponsor’s environment is merged 
with platform ecosystem’s environment. 
Platform sponsor is the overall designer and IP rights 
holder. Some IP rights are owned by third parties. 
Platform design and IP rights are negotiated 
and distributed between participating firms. 
Platform sponsor sets the direction and controls a 
major part of the underlying platform technology. 
Some modules are owned by contributors. 
The direction of the platform is negotiated, 
and control of the underlying technology is 
shared and/or distributed between firms. 
Sponsor provides overall organizing structure for the 
platform via ecosystem governance rules. 
Contributors can contest some rules and have lateral 
power (i.e. not hierarchically controlled). 
Overall organizing structure for the platform 
is negotiated. The sponsor implements these 
via “consortium” governance rules. 
Business association is transactional. Contributors do 
not necessarily need to be in a relationship with the 
platform sponsor. 
Business association is relational. 
Participants enter into a business relationship 
with other organizations. 
Examples: Airbnb, Uber, Mozilla Firefox, Apple 
Appstore, Android OS, Apple iOS. 
*Examples: SURFsara, Vivli, Nallian and 
customized solutions from Salesforce, Adlink.  
*Most platforms here are not as common and public as in Type I. They often have a limited scope of targeted firms, 
usually within the same industry, and are often custom built. 
Inter-Organizational Systems (IOS) 
Inter-organizational platforms build on the concept of inter-organizational systems (IOS) developed in IS 
literature since the 1990s (e.g. Bakos, 1991; Munkvold, 1999; Johnston & Gregor, 2000). These studies 
showed that organizations benefit from collaboration through IS-based inter-firm synergies that enable 
information, innovation, processes, services, and other resources to be seamlessly shared between firms 
(Markus, 2007). For example, computer-aided reservation systems enabled airports, airlines, border 
agencies, and affiliated services to offer seamless services to passengers by connecting passenger data 
between these institutions. Some benefits such as open and uniform standards that allow inter-connection 
of devices can only be achieved if major players agree to use the standards for the products and services 
they offer (Wigand, Steinfield & Markus, 2005).  
Research also shows that IOS generate challenges. One challenge faced by providers of IOS is how they can 
attract firms to use them. The provider of an IOS needs to show that the benefits for joining, for example 
by using a specific standard or sharing a particular technology, outweigh switching costs for a firm that had 
internal or alternative systems for the services being offered through the IOS (Markus, 2007). Organizations 
may find it difficult to adopt a new IOS if they have higher dependence on their internal systems, which 
increases switching costs (Zhu, Kraemer, Gurbaxani & Xu, 2006). Another challenge area is a governance 
problem that involves the coordination of multiple independent players who may be competing, have 
different goals, interests, and incentives (Johnston & Gregor, 2000; Markus & Bui, 2012). The provider of 
an IOS would need to negotiate some form of consensus between firms in such areas as design, standards, 
and shared processes (Wigand, Steinfield & Markus, 2005; Markus & Bui, 2012). To achieve coordination 
and control, the IOS provider needs to be trusted by the targeted firms, and such trust often rests in the IOS 
provider’s IS capabilities and competencies, leadership and unifying vision, as well as the ability to provide 
concessions on design choices and standards (Ibrahim & Ribbers, 2009). 
Data platforms are a specific type of platform that inherits several IOS attributes. Such platforms offer 
services such as data ingestion & integration, data analytics & visualization, templates for data gathering, 
data sharing & synchronized reporting, and field-level forecasts (de Reuver et al., 2018; Jarvenpaa & 
Markus, 2018). Data platforms generate economies of scale by affording small firms that could not afford 
the cost of owning a comprehensive suite of data services as a single firm, to achieve this through 
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collaboration with other firms. Larger firms also benefit from accessing comprehensive data that they would 
otherwise not without collaborating with other firms. In the case of data platforms, direct network effects 
are created when benchmarking features of the platform improve as more firms join the platform. Indirect 
network effects are created as aggregated market level insights for interested parties outside participating 
firms are generated as more firms join the platform. 
The Critical Mass Challenge 
The theory of critical mass has its roots in sociology and is often used to explain collective behavior amongst 
individuals using common goods (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira, 1985). The theory explains the conditions 
under which reciprocal behavior gets started and becomes self-sustaining (Markus, 1987). Granovetter 
(1978, pp.1420) referred to critical mass as a “threshold” of actors who must ‘show an interest’ or ‘make a 
decision’ before other actors follow suit. In order to warrant reciprocal behavior, not only is the amount of 
initial interests or decisions important, but also who makes those decisions (e.g. firm type and size), and 
the nature of their decisions (e.g. reputation and influence). This in turn determines whether other parties 
will be triggered to follow. Applied to platforms, the theory proposes the issues and conditions that must be 
addressed to attract participation of a sufficient number of users or contributors to make the platform self-
sustaining (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). 
From the onset of development, a major concern for a platform sponsor is how to attract both contributors 
to the platform and users of the products and services generated by its contributors (Parker, Van Alstyne & 
Choudary, 2016). Developing and launching inter-organizational platforms is particularly challenging 
because of existing conflicting interests and goals (Schirrmacher, Ondrus & Kude, 2017; de Reuver et al., 
2018). If there are few firms participating, the economies of scale may not be reached, transaction costs 
remain high and it becomes difficult to justify switching costs for those firms that already have an existing 
solution. Therefore, practices for coordinating firms to create a critical mass are vital for its successful 
development and eventual launch.  
Like any other platforms, inter-organizational platforms also exhibit network effects, but unlike Type I 
platforms (Table 1) that can attract users at a global scale, inter-firm platforms have a limited scope of 
targeted firms, usually within the same organizational field. Thus, if major firms, for instance in the 
adoption of a standards platform, were to reject the initiative, such a standard would not take off (Markus 
& Bui, 2012). Where there are a mix of firms, some may wait to see if their allies, competitors, or influential 
firms are participating (de Reuver et al., 2018). This gives rise to the so-called ‘chicken-n-egg’ problem, but 
with a game-theoretic twist. In order to attract firms to join, the platform needs to have a significant number 
of other firms that have already joined (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). Platform providers in an inter-
organizational setting must break this paralyzing dynamic where prospective firms wait for other firms to 
participate prior to making a commitment.  
Learning from both IOS and platform literatures, we observe another unique challenge to the critical mass 
problem in the development and launching of inter-organizational platforms. They seem to require a critical 
mass much earlier in their development process than other types of platforms. In Type I platforms (Table 
1), the development of the platforms largely occurs internally, meaning that their users have little or no 
participation in the development phases of the platform. Also Type I platforms often require the platform 
to launch first, then the issue of attracting users to join comes after, which places the critical mass question 
after the platform itself has been launched. Thus, platform launch is possible before user onboarding (Evans 
& Schmalensee, 2010). However, we posit that, in inter-firm platforms (Type II), a critical mass of firms 
needs to be achieved earlier in their development process, and this is dependent on how the platform 
sponsor can steer the various organizations into fully participating. 
Thus, practices proposed by previous research about generating a critical mass, which assume an already 
existing platform, may not work well in conditions where the platform is an aspirational goal between firms 
with different governance regimes. Such practices include: opening the platform’s resources using flexible 
standards, open codes and less restrictive boundary tools (e.g. APIs and SDKs) (Ondrus, Gannamaneni & 
Lyytinen, 2015); onboarding users in a specific strategic order (Schirrmacher, Ondrus & Kude, 2017); 
tipping adjacent markets (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008); and using creative pricing models (Hagiu & Spulber, 
2013; Stummer, Kundisch & Decker, 2018). It is still unknown what are the practices that platform sponsors 
can rely on to attract participants in an inter-organizational context, and when they should be relied upon. 
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Research Methodology 
To problematize (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) critical mass theory and explore its boundary conditions 
(Whetten, 1989) in inter-organizational platform development, we used data from a longitudinal, revelatory 
case study. The study is part on an on-going longitudinal research covering a two-and-half-year period 
(August 2017 – February 2020), documenting unfolding events as 46 organizations in the tourism sector 
in New Zealand worked together to develop an inter-organizational platform for sharing data services and 
resources. The questions about ‘how’ and ‘why’ a phenomenon operates the way it does and the behavior of 
the actors driving it in its context are well founded justifications of IS case study inquiries (Benbasat et al., 
1987). Additionally, recent studies (e.g. de Reuver, Sørensen & Basole, 2017) note a dearth of research in 
platform ecosystems that assesses real-time platform development projects that involve multiple 
institutions taking part, with a perspective that covers an entire industry sector. This case was selected for 
its uniqueness, depth of access, and its potential to generate new insights to platform development 
(Benbasat et al., 1987). 
Access was made available to the researchers early in the platform sponsor’s project, creating an 
opportunity to immerse and observe the nuances of platform development via participating in various 
workshops and interviewing the key players as the project evolved.  Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with representatives of the 46 organizations that were participating in the platform development 
project. These include providers of visitor experiences (skylines, ziptreks, canyon swings, etc.) airlines, 
airports, hotel chains, bus and tour operators, cycle-trail operators, restaurants, museums, and government 
departments. All interviews followed a semi-structured protocol, lasted 30-75 minutes, and were recorded 
and transcribed. Interviewees were encouraged to describe their engagement with the Main Trade 
Association (MTA) – the platform sponsor in the project. They described their motivations (or lack of) for 
participation, their data-driven practices, challenges in building ecosystem level data platform in the 
tourism sector, required technical and organizational capabilities, and their perspective on the overall 
feasibility of the project. To triangulate and complement interview data, one of the researchers also 
participated in key workshops and meetings, which enabled participatory observation during the project. 
Documentary evidence was also collected (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Sources of Evidence 
Primary Sources Explanation Number of 
Interviews 
54  
Interviews with representatives 
of the 46 org. & the MTA 
Interviews included CEOs, Heads of Departments, Data & 
Insights specialists, owners, and representatives of 
organizations participating in the project.  
Secondary Sources Explanation Documents 
Steering Committee Notes 
Meeting agendas and notes with action items, discussion, 
and decision actions 
500+ pages 
Meeting Notes 
Meeting agendas, presentations and notes from general and 
other MTA led Platform Development meetings 
Web Page Content 
Content from MTA’s official website. Includes content from 
related government websites such as Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment (MBIE) and StatsNZ 
Press Releases articles 
Official press releases and news/journalistic content about 
the platform development project 
Field Events Explanation Participants 
Tourism Data Workshop Workshop facilitated by MBIE, Wellington and Auckland 50+  
U of Canterbury Tourism 
Research Team Meeting 
Facilitated by the MTA, Christchurch  10  
West Coast LH Meeting Facilitated by the MTA, West Coast 25  
CECA & RTOs Meeting Facilitated by the MTA, Palmerston North 11  
Tourism Data Hui Workshop facilitated by MBIE, Wellington and Auckland 50+  
 
Data analysis was inductive, with concepts from platform ecosystems, inter-organizational systems, and 
critical mass used as an informing background to the study. The units of analysis were critical mass issues 
facing the platform sponsor, eliciting practical responses at each development phase. The first part of coding 
was intended to capture the key phases of the platform development processes, indicating which and when 
critical mass issues emerged in phases of the platform development processes. The second part of coding 
captured the practices that were used by the MTA as well as how they were received and responded to by 
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the participating firms. Data coding and analysis was iterative, with multiple meetings in which all authors 
looked for consistent themes, deliberated on emerging codes and their categorizations. We made sense 
process analyses, debated, and redefined codes. The end result was an agreement of the key phases of 
development emerging from our process analysis and five associated critical mass issues faced at each stage, 
all of which can be seen in Table 3 (p.8). It is important to note that only data on the research question 
regarding critical mass was used in this paper, which is a subset of the larger dataset that covers many other 
research questions and variables in this ongoing program of research. 
Results 
Brief Case Description  
Through their Main Trade Association (MTA), a network of 46 organizations from the New Zealand tourism 
sector started a project to develop a platform ecosystem for sharing data services and resources. The 
companies reported challenges such as multiple datasets from various sources, a limited industry-level view 
about domestic tourism, and problems regarding quality and consistency in key data such as tourism 
spending, visitor volumes and visitor flows. Interviews with representatives of small enterprises such as 
restaurants, holiday homes, backpackers, and skyline & canyon swing operators confirmed that they were 
not using many data services because of the cost and skills needed. They struggled to keep an overview of 
what was happening in their local markets. To them, simple-to-use aggregated data insights from 
visualization tools, graphs, and simplified reports would be beneficial. For larger firms, their main concern 
was access to granular, raw data that would allow them to conduct their own analyses. Whilst they had 
robust internal systems for analyzing their internally produced data, they had limited access to data from 
the industry, particularly small enterprises that occupied a large share of the tourism market. They were 
also concerned about the quality of the data available from local authorities and government departments.  
Critical Mass Issues during Platform Development 
We found that the MTA (platform sponsor) faced critical mass issues early before platform launch. These 
were at various stages during the evolution of the project, starting from the initial discovery phase, during 
the development of strategic goals, the formation of business networks around the project, the design of the 
platform, and when implementation began (see Table 3). Here we outline critical mass issues faced by the 
MTA at each phase and the practices used to deal with them.  
Attracting initial interest: In the first phase of the project the MTA made efforts to make sense of the 
organizational field and discover the various data interests of the firms. The critical mass issue appeared to 
be about how to convince them and have a large enough group of firms with interest in the project. The 
MTA developed a framework of the platform agenda – a document which spelt out the potential of the 
proposed platform to the data space in the tourism sector. With this document, the MTA’s project leader 
went on a ‘gentle crusade’, telling a compelling story to convince prospective firms to participate. He noted: 
“There definitely is an understanding of the current limitations in the data space, but there are 
also various proposed solutions from different quarters. So, to draw firms to this project, we are 
informing tourism businesses of our plans. We have developed this Insight Framework as a 
comprehensive guide to our agenda.” 
Aligning heterogenous goals: Having garnered initial interest, in the second phase of the project, the 
MTA was faced with a different issue – all the interested firms had different goals about data, relating to 
their own internal operations. At this stage, the MTA sought to create a unifying strategic vision of the 
platform that considered the heterogeneity of those goals. Through a series of workshops, the MTA had 
discussions with representatives from each and every prospective firm. In the discussions, the MTA sought 
to understand the various strategic goals about data that each firm was concerned with. Key priorities were 
ranked and ‘quick wins’ and long-term solutions were discussed during the workshops. A data priorities 
framework that harmonized different goals and linked them to the strategic vision of the platform was a key 
output of the deliberations at this stage. As noted by the MTA’s project leader: 
“To move the project forward, a clear and unifying industry voice is needed to determine 
priorities for the platform from all the various goals that were put forward by members, and for 
establishing mechanisms for undertaking these priorities.” 
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Sustaining commitment to the project: In the third phase the MTA faced another challenge – 
sustaining commitment to the project by the firms. Some firms were hesitant to commit their time on the 
project despite having shown initial interest and agreed with the strategic direction of the project. Some 
firms expressed that they were not sure if the MTA had capacity to lead the project, and others were 
distrustful that other firms would not contribute their time, staff, and resources as much as they did. 
Additionally, some firms felt ‘disconnected’ to other participants. Sentiments such as these were raised: 
“The project makes sense to us and the value is undeniable. But, for such a technical project that 
requires the staff time of our IT experts and data specialists, we can only do so much. To fully 
commit our staff time to the project would mean that other companies need to do the same. But, 
as of now we don’t know what other firms are doing. Are they as willing as we are?” 
To resolve this and sustain commitment, the MTA developed a business network of firms in the project. A 
leadership panel, technical group, and general members forum was developed which required regular 
meetings to discuss contentious issues and find areas of cooperation and commitment. This developed 
mutual trust and closer ties between the firms. 
Negotiating architecture design: In the fourth phase, the MTA faced the challenge of attaining 
consensus between different design choices of the platform presented by each firm. For instance, whilst 
large firms were interested in a design that emphasized raw data as output, smaller firms were interested 
in simplified templates and reports that they could easily use without having to make further analyses as 
they largely lacked the capacity and capabilities to do so. Their divergent views on this can be summed:  
“For us, we would like data in basically granular, raw format. Data that we can analyze and do 
stuff with. Because we have the capabilities and teams to do so. … we may need to integrate it 
with our own internal data and work with it with our own models.” 
“We are looking for a place where latest reports about trends in the market are posted regularly 
by key players, giving us a market analysis that we need to benchmark ourselves.” 
Private firms sought more controlled standards to protect their data assets whilst public institutions and 
smaller enterprises sough flexible standards. One public sector provider of tourism services indicated: 
“… we are working hard to offer our customers easy, simple, efficient ways to build innovative 
connections with us. Our APIs use the RESTful interface and JSON format to allow our customers 
to openly and seamlessly interface with our systems. But, in the previous meeting, I got the sense 
that our private partners don’t seem to resonate well with open standards. They are more 
protective of their proprietary assets.” 
There were also disagreements about whether levels of access would be controlled between participating 
firms, with larger firms seeking selective access whilst smaller firms sought open access. In a design 
workshop, representatives of the firms drew diagrams to illustrate what they envisioned about the design, 
architecture, and features of the platform. They all had diverse representations of the future platform some 
seeking integrated and centralized architectures whilst others sought distributed configurations. To achieve 
consensus the MTA used the design workshops as an opportunity to develop a core architecture that 
adapted the various propositions of the firms. This enabled coring of the platform design and created 
common understanding of the architecture. The MTA needed a large enough consensus from the firms that 
would support its eventual development. At this stage, the MTA made crucial decisions to remove less-
desirable design options. This saw some firms’ choices being prioritized whilst other choices were not met. 
Sustaining commitment to implementation: In the fifth phase, the MTA faced another commitment 
challenge – this time it was about sustaining participation in the implementation of various artefacts of the 
platform. Firms at this stage had agreed with the strategic vision of the platform and its proposed 
architecture. They were now required to commit significant resources such as their staff time and skills to 
develop some aspects of the platform’s core technologies. Some firms were interested in working on specific 
parts of the platform that were aligned to their businesses whilst others had limited resources to contribute. 
The MTA needed to organize them in a way that would enable each one to contribute. Firms were grouped 
together into smaller technical taskforces to work on specific modules according to their strengths, 
capacities and declared areas of interest.
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Table 3:  Summary of critical mass issues & platform sponsor’s practices during platform development 
Phase Critical 
Mass Issue 
Question(s) framing Views of 
Participating Firms 
Sponsor’s 
Practices 
Explanation 
Phase 1: 
Initial 
discovery & 
sensemaking 
Attracting 
Initial 
interest 
(Governance 
Issue) 
What are the incentives of the 
players? Which players and 
complementary interests can 
be aligned and satisfied 
through the platform? Can 
these players form a 
sustainable group enough to 
pursue the project? 
Each firm was 
concerned with finding 
out if their internal 
interests about data 
would be served better 
by the platform. 
Selling a 
compelling 
story to attract 
initial interest 
To create initial interest from a first group, large enough 
to pursue the platform agenda, the sponsor told a 
compelling story about how the platform would solve the 
data issues and transform the data space in the sector. 
The sponsor identified players and complimentary 
interests that could be aligned and satisfied through the 
envisioned platform (i.e. discovery). Sensemaking and 
feasibility studies were carried out at this stage. 
Phase 2: 
Development 
of Strategic 
Goals for the 
Platform  
 
Aligning 
Heterogenous 
Goals 
(Governance 
Issue and 
Architecture 
Issue) 
What are the various strategic 
goals about data for all the 
interested players? Which 
goals can be harmonized / 
linked into a strategic vision 
for the platform? What 
number of players are willing 
to rally behind the new 
harmonized goal/vision of the 
platform? 
Firms were concerned 
with finding out if their 
internal goals about 
data would be met 
through the sponsor’s 
vision of the platform. 
Some firms found that 
their goals for data 
were different whilst 
others were aligned. 
Aligning 
conflicting goals 
and developing 
a strategic 
vision of the 
platform 
The sponsor sought uniform ways to harmonize different 
goals and link them to the strategic vision for the 
platform. The sponsor encouraged participation by 
meeting with the various internal goals of the interested 
organizations. The effort was to develop a unifying 
strategic vision of the platform. This required a large 
enough number of players that were willing to rally 
behind the goal/vision. Several leadership panel 
meetings were held at this stage. 
Phase 3: 
Formation of 
Business 
Networks  
 
Sustaining 
Commitment 
(Governance 
Issue) 
Which players are willing to 
commit to project-term 
business relationship? Is there 
a large enough group of firms 
within the business network 
formed around the project to 
sustain the it? 
Some firms were 
hesitant, distrustful of 
the MTA, and generally 
needed convincing that 
the MTA had both 
leadership and capacity 
“to pull it off.” 
Playing a 
leadership role 
and creating 
confidence and 
trust in 
leadership: 
The sponsor sought to maintain sufficient relationships 
around the platform development project. The sponsor 
sought to build trust and confidence in the leadership of 
the project and strengthen relations between 
participating firms. To achieve this, workshops and 
meetings were held to discuss contentious issues and find 
areas of cooperation and commitment.  
Phase 4:  
Architecture 
Design 
Negotiating 
Architecture 
Design 
(Architecture 
Issue) 
What are the various features, 
standards and architecture 
desired?  Which design, 
standards and architecture 
options suit a sustainable 
group of players, and which 
options are less desirable (e.g. 
have high adoption costs)? 
In various workshops, 
representatives of the 
firms illustrated what 
they envisioned about 
the design, architecture 
and features of the 
platform. They all had 
diverse representations 
of the future platform.  
Coring the 
platform 
design, and 
creating a 
common 
understanding 
of the 
architecture 
The sponsor sought to maintain a balance in the 
architecture, features and standards of the platform to 
suit a large enough group of players who would support 
its eventual development. The sponsor made crucial 
decisions to remove less-desirable design options. This 
saw some firms’ choices being prioritized whilst other 
choices were not met (e.g. those that had high switching 
costs, demanded unique standards, or simply did not 
have enough backing from other firms) 
Phase 5: 
Development 
of platform 
artefacts 
Sustaining 
Commitment 
to Implemen-
tation 
(Governance 
Issue) 
How can the various artefacts 
of the platform architecture be 
developed and implemented? 
Who will deal with which 
specific parts of the platform 
development processes and 
how can they be promoted?  
Firms were interested 
in working on specific 
aspects of the platform 
that were aligned to 
their businesses.  
Implementation 
tactics such as 
grouping firms 
to develop 
specific aspects 
matching their 
capacities  
When the development process of specific artefacts or 
parts of the platform began, sought to attract 
participation in the development process and 
implementation of the various artefacts. Firms were 
grouped together into smaller technical taskforces to 
work on specific modules according to their strengths, 
capacities and declared areas of interest. 
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Discussion & Conclusion 
Our analysis revealed that in inter-firm platforms, a critical mass is needed at various stages before launch, 
and for the launch process itself to continue. In our case, it was a not single-period event occurring after 
platform launch. We found that critical mass challenges emerge in different ways, as a series of different 
issues that the platform sponsor must address at different platform development phases. In Phase 1 it was 
important for the sponsor to understand which interests were available at conception, and who made those 
interests, as well as how varied they were. In Phase 2 it was important to establish which firms agreed (or 
disagreed) with the strategic vision of the platform, and what was the content of those disagreements. In 
Phase 3 the sponsor needed to know which firms were willing to commit to the project for the length of the 
development process, their firm-size, reputation, and influence over other firms. In Phase 4 the sponsor 
needed to align the various design choices made by the firms, and to also understand their motivations, 
their commitment, and capacities to support those choices. In Phase 5 the platform sponsor needed to 
sustain commitment to the implementation of several aspects of the platform. Thus, there were many points 
at which gathering a critical mass was required when the platform itself was an aspirational goal.  
Another key observation is that, apart from considering the number of firms that were participating at each 
stage, the sponsor considered whether the nature of interests, consensuses, levels of negotiations, and 
influences that were achieved would be able to sustain the project as it evolved.  Previous research tends to 
treat critical mass as having a quantitative property whose function is the number of users to an n-threshold 
level (c.f. Evans & Schmalensee, 2010; Granovetter 1978). In our case, we noticed qualitative properties 
such as reputation, interests, commitments, digital capabilities, goals, consensuses, and decisions, all of 
which were crucial in determining whether sustainability is achieved to move to the next phase. Some 
properties were of the users’ aspirations (e.g. interests and goals), their actions (e.g. choices and decisions), 
their qualities (size, influence, and capabilities), and others were of the relationship between users (e.g. 
consensuses). Here there is an opportunity for future research that considers the influence of these 
properties in warranting reciprocal behavior needed to achieve a critical mass (Markus, 1987).  
We observed from our findings that practices addressed in previous research, such as the use of first party 
content subsidies and creative pricing options (Hagiu & Spulber, 2013; Stummer, Kundisch & Decker, 2018) 
are not available to the platform sponsor as the platform itself will still be under development. Onboarding 
strategies only become possible after platform launch (de Reuver et al., 2018; Schirrmacher, Ondrus & 
Kude, 2017). Tipping adjacent markets (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008) was also not possible as the project had 
a limited scope of firms within a single sector. Similarly, opening-up the platform to attract users and 
contributors assumes that launch would have already occurred (Ondrus, Gannamaneni & Lyytinen, 2015). 
Thus, practices of the platform sponsor were different from what we learn from previous research about 
gathering a critical mass. They are more concerned with steering firms with heterogenous goals and profiles 
towards participation. These included selling a compelling story about how to solve an existing problem, 
aligning conflicting goals, and developing a strategic vision, playing a leadership role, creating a common 
understanding of design choices, and amassing commitment at implementation. Convincing firms to 
participate requires active management and deliberate practices before a platform is launched.  
Limitations of the study pertain to the single and ongoing nature of the case study. Whilst the project has 
evolved well to the extent that we have observed, the ultimate success of the platform in unknown. In 
addition, although our initial conjectures appear to be supported by the data, similar research is still scant 
and needed to corroborate findings. Although we observed critical mass issues that the platform sponsor 
dealt with, we are yet to fully examine how each issue manifests itself, and how it can be measured. Future 
research can examine how such properties as influence, reputation, and negotiations can affect how 
decisions are interpreted by firms, which affects reciprocal behavior needed to achieve a critical mass. 
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